

# Pass-the-Hash: What is it & What to do about it?

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# Story time



# Defending Trends



"Symantec Corp. invented commercial antivirus software to protect computers from hackers a quarter-century ago. Now the company says such tactics are doomed to failure."



#### 'Antivirus is dead? If you think that's news, you've been living in a different world'

**Summary:** With the continuing rise of cloud services, security execs have been proclaiming the death of antivirus software. But, according to F-Secure, the security is not so much dead as changed beyond all recognition.



By Eeva Haaramo for Norse Code | May 14, 2014 -- 08:43 GMT (01:43 PDT)



Symantec made headlines last week when a senior exec proclaimed antivirus software was "dead". It might seem a bold statement, but according to Finnish security company F-Secure, it's just a statement of fact, reflecting trends in an industry that's fast moving away from PCs.

"For years, signature-based antivirus detection has been only a fraction of what security companies have been offering," says Timo Laaksonen, VP of Content Cloud at F-Secure. "We have a huge arsenal of other tools. If someone thinks that antivirus being dead is news then we don't know in what world they have been living in for the past five to six years."

### Pass-the-Hash in the News

News

BBC

Sport Weather

Travel Future

#### The New York Times

#### January 30, 2013

#### Hackers in China Attacked The Times Last 4 Months

#### By NICOLE PERLROTH

SAN FRANCISCO — For the last four months, Chinese hackers have persistently attacked New York Times, infiltrating its computer systems and getting passwords for its reporters other employees.

After surreptitiously tracking the intruders to study their movements and help erect bette defenses to block them, The Times and computer security experts have expelled the attac and kept them from breaking back in.

Remote access was still restricted "as a precaution" the group said.



The company took its website offline after the attack and now carries a message on its front page apologising for any inconvenience.



#### Chinese Hackers Hit U.S. Media

Wall Street Journal, New York Times Are Breached in Campaign That Stretches Back Several Years

By SIOBHAN GORMAN, DEVLIN BARRETT and DANNY YADRON Updated Jan. 31, 2013 8:28 p.m. ET

WASHINGTON—Chinese hackers believed to have government links have been conducting wideranging electronic surveillance of media companies including The Wall Street Journal, apparently to spy on reporters covering China and other issues, people familiar with the incidents said.

#### The virus erased data on three-quarters of Aramco's corporate PCs — documents, spreadsheets, e-mails, files — replacing all of it with an image of a burning American flag.

### Pass-the-Hash (PtH) Definition

- "Hash" = cached credential
  - Usually not "cleartext"
  - Identically powerful to "cleartext" by most systems
  - Can be stored in memory or persisted on disk
- Most operating systems cache credentials for single sign on (SSO)



### Pass-the-Hash Technique

- Attacker gains local admin access to initial system
- Uses collected hashes to move laterally through the network
- Additional hashes are collected as they go
  - New hashes give access to additional systems
  - Network/domain privileged account compromised  $\rightarrow$  Game Over



### Pass the Hash

- 1. Attacker targets workstation(s)
- 2. User running as local admin (or critical security vulnerability) is compromised, attacker harvests credentials
- 3. Attacker uses credentials for lateral movement or privilege escalation
- 4. Attacker acquires domain admin credentials
- 5. Attacker exercises full control of data and systems in the environment





### Windows and Pass-the-Hash

- Windows supports SSO through security packages, which store "hashes":
  - MSV1\_0: NTLM, NTLMv2 hash
  - WDigest: cleartext
  - Kerberos: TGTs, service tickets and cleartext
- Many connections require NTLMv2
  - Target system specified as IP address
  - Legacy applications
  - Server configuration

### Windows Pass-the-Hash Attack Tools

- "Discovered" in 1997
  - SMB client accepted NTLM password hashes
- "Weaponized" in 2008 by Hernan Ochoa (Amplia Security)
  - Pass-the-Hash Toolkit injected NTLM hashes into a logon session
  - More advanced Windows Credential Editor (WCE) introduced in 2010
  - Bread-and-butter for pentesters

### Pass-the-Ticket

Kerberos is not immuneFirst "discovered" in 2010:



### • Weaponized by Herman Ochoa in 2011



#### Windows Credential Editor

### Current Guidance

Mitigation	Effectiveness	Effort required	Privilege escalation	Lateral movement
Mitigation 1: Restrict and protect high privileged domain accounts	Excellent	Medium	٧	-
Mitigation 2: Restrict and protect local accounts with administrative privileges	Excellent	Low	-	V
Mitigation 3: Restrict inbound traffic using the Windows Firewall	Excellent	Medium	-	V

Other mitigation	Effectiveness	Effort required	Privilege escalation	Lateral movement
Disable the NTLM protocol	Minimal	High	-	-
Smart cards and multifactor authentication	Minimal	High	-	-
Jump servers	Minimal	High	٧	-
Rebooting workstations and servers	Minimal	Low	-	-

Microsoft <u>published</u> Pass-the-Hash guidance in December 2012.
Highlighted best practices and dispelled urban legends



## Local Account Mitigations

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User: mr-win81\abby-local

S-1-5-21-284636763-615607808-1007595490-1001

Session: 1 Logon Session: 25e12

#### Virtualized: No

SID:

Group	Flags	
BUILTIN\Administrators	Deny	
BUILTIN\Users	Mandatory	-
CONSOLE LOGON	Mandatory	
Everyone	Mandatory	
LOCAL	Mandatory	
Logon SID (S-1-5-5-0-154963)	Mandatory	
Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level	Integrity	
mr-win81\None	Mandatory	
NT AUTHORITY Authenticated Users	Mandatory	
NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE	Mandatory	
NT AUTHORITY\Local account	Mandatory	
NT AUTHORITY\Local account and member of Administrators group	Deny	
NT AUTHORITY/NTLM Authentication	Mandatory	

### Two new well-known groups:

- "Local account"
- "Local account and member of Administrators group"

# • Useful for restricting access

### Domain Account Mitigations



Benjamin Delpy

aentilkiwi

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@msftsecresponse @msftsecurity LSASS security improvements #windows8.1 : domain account secured by default, nice work pic.twitter.com/zaIGUEz9t1

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### Reduced plaintext footprint

- TSPKG
- Wdigest
- Kerberos

### • LSASS Protected Mode

# Additional Domain Account Mitigations

A secretary with no access to anything is phished. The attacker easily determines this but installs a kit to introduce malware that degrades performance. The secretary calls the help desk. Using smart card MFA, the help desk remotely connects to the secretary's machine. The malware captures the help desk hash. The attacker can then replay that hash on other machines, gradually gaining information on those machines. They can further capture the hashes on those systems and keep exploiting.

- US General Services Administration (GSA)

- Remote administration can expand exploits
  - RDP sends plaintext password to target

### New "restricted administration" mode sends no delegable credential

/restrictedAdmin -- Connects you to the remote PC or server in Restricted Administration mode. In this mode, credentials won't be sent to the remote PC or server, which can protect you if you connect to a PC that has been compromised. However, connections made from the remote PC might not be authenticated by other PCs and servers, which might impact app functionality and compatibility. Implies /admin.

### Domain Protected Accounts

	â	abby-prote	cted Pro	operties		?	x
General	Address	Account	Profile	Telephones	3	Organia	zation
Remote	control	Remote [	note Desktop Services Profile COM		e Desktop Services Profile COM+		M+
Membe	rOf	Dial-in	Envi	Environment		Sessions	
Member o Name	f:	Active Direct	ory Domain	Services Fold	der		
Member o Name Administ	f: rators	Active Direct	ory Domain m/Builtin	Services Fold	der		
Member o Name Administ Domain	f: rators Admins	Active Direct mr-domain.co mr-domain.co	ory Domain m/Builtin m/Users	Services Fold	der		
Member o Name Administ Domain Domain	f: rators Admins Users	Active Direct mr-domain.co mr-domain.co mr-domain.co	ory Domain m/Builtin m/Users m/Users	) Services Fold	ler		

### Client hardening

- Policy restrictions
- NTLM hash discarded

- Domain hardening
  - NTLM authentication fails
  - Kerberos rejects weak ciphers
  - Kerberos limits ticket lifetime

### Authentication Policies and Silos

- *Authentication Policies* constrain Kerberos ticket issuance
- Can configure conditions on users, computers or resources and ticket lifetime
- Authentication Silos enable isolation of accounts and resources that have constrained network scope
  - *Authentication Policies* are configured for users, computers and managed service accounts belonging to Silo
  - Silo member tokens include Silo claim

### Conclusion

Network security is the key to address the PtH

- Windows 8.1/2012R introduces some tools for limiting PtH
  - Local account protections
  - Domain account protections
  - Protected domain accounts
  - Authentication policies and Silos



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